Under the Inwood standard, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant continued to supply a product “to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. The extent of a defendant’s knowledge of the wrongful activities of the direct infringer is the focus of courts [...]
Generalized knowledge that trademark infringement has taken place has been held insufficient to sustain a claim of contributory liability. Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93, 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) affirming in part and remanding in part, 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 470, 508-510 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P., 2009 WL 3075205, [...]
The question under Inwood of whether a plaintiff’s proactive measures give a defendant “reason to know,” i.e. constructive knowledge, of infringement, generally has been treated by the courts in the context of willful blindness, discussed in detail infra. In Tiffany, supra, however, the court was meticulous to examine separately whether Tiffany’s generalized assertions of infringement, [...]
The knowledge requirement under the Inwood standard can be met by demonstrating a defendant’s “willful blindness” to ongoing trademark violations. See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc. 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)(“willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”), citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, [...]
1. End User Agreements. In a case involving a software company that had incorporated potentially infringing “clipart” images into its software programs, the company’s inclusion of an end-user licensing agreement restricting the purchaser’s use of those images precluded a finding of willful blindness. See Medic Alert Found. U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F.Supp.2d 933, [...]
