The knowledge requirement under the Inwood standard can be met by demonstrating a defendant’s “willful blindness” to ongoing trademark violations. See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc. 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)(“willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”), citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, [...]
1. End User Agreements. In a case involving a software company that had incorporated potentially infringing “clipart” images into its software programs, the company’s inclusion of an end-user licensing agreement restricting the purchaser’s use of those images precluded a finding of willful blindness. See Medic Alert Found. U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F.Supp.2d 933, [...]
The receipt by a defendant of a letter from the plaintiff demanding that he cease and desist from violating his marks may weigh in favor of a finding of willful blindness, particularly when accompanied by other compelling evidence. In one such case, the fact that the defendants had received a cease and desist letter regarding their [...]
Where a defendant, upon being notified of potential infringement, corrects the alleged infringement, the court will take such action into account in its general analysis of the element of knowledge under Inwood. Although the courts have not, in these cases, necessarily applied the “willful blindness” test, they are nevertheless discussed here because they tend to [...]
The knowledge and willful blindness considerations discussed supra have been expressly distinguished by the courts from an affirmative duty to “seek out and prevent” or “take precautions against” trademark violations by another party, which is not required by the doctrine of contributory liability. See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc. 955 F.2d [...]
