The notion that a party who does not himself infringe another’s trademark may nevertheless be indirectly liable for such infringement is not expressly provided for in the Lanham Act, but rather has emerged from case law over the years. See generally John T. Cross, “Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement,” [...]
B. The Elements of Contributory Liability under Inwood: 1. The Requirement of Intentional Inducement
Although the majority of contributory liability cases have proceeded under the second prong of the Inwood standard – supplying a product – a few courts have addressed circumstances in which inducement formed the basis for liability. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 2010 WL 2541367 (S.D.N.Y.); Transdermal Products, Inc. v. Performance Contract Packaging, [...]
Under the Inwood standard, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant continued to supply a product “to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. The extent of a defendant’s knowledge of the wrongful activities of the direct infringer is the focus of courts [...]
Generalized knowledge that trademark infringement has taken place has been held insufficient to sustain a claim of contributory liability. Tiffany v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93, 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) affirming in part and remanding in part, 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 470, 508-510 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P., 2009 WL 3075205, [...]
